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Abstract 
The interrelationship between financial constraints and firm activity is a hotly debated issue. The way firms cope 
with financial constraints is fundamental to the analysis of monetary transmissions, of financial stability and of 
growth and development. The CBI Industrial Trends Survey contains detailed information on the financial con-
straints faced by a large sample of UK manufacturers. We use the quarterly CBI Industrial Trends Survey firm 
level data between the January 1989 and October 1999. Our cleaned sample contains 49,244 quarterly 
observations on 5,196 firms. As more than 63% of the observations refer to firms with less than 200 employees, 
the data set is especially well suited for comparing large and small companies. After presenting the data-set, we 
develop a new method of checking the informational content of the data. We have to confront the fact that the 
relationship between investment activity and financial constraints is ambivalent due to simultaneity. However, 
the link between financial constraints on the one hand and the prevalence and duration of capacity gaps on the 
other should be unambiguously positive. We obtain two important  results. First, we show that there is 
informational content in the data on financial constraints. Specifically, financially constrained firms take longer 
to close capacity gaps. This indicates that financial constraints do indeed play a part in the investment process. 
Second, small firms close their capacity gaps faster than large firms. 
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Financial Constraints and Capacity Adjustment  
in the United Kingdom: Are Small Firms Really Different? 
Evidence from a Large Panel of Survey Data1 
 
1. Introduction and summary 
Understanding the causes and effects of financial constraints for firms is of key importance 
for a variety of policy issues. In monetary transmission theory, the credit channel is supposed 
to condition and amplify the ‘neo-classical’ relative price effects of interest rate changes on 
firm activity. Monetary policy may affect the ability of banks to finance firms (bank lending 
channel), or else influence firms’ ability to attract external finance by affecting the value of 
their equity (balance sheet channel). Second, financial constraints on real activities form one 
crucial link that determines the real consequences of financial imbalances of various types: 
banking crises, asset price bubbles, or government debt. Ultimately, financial constraints due 
to asymmetric information are especially important for those future oriented activities that 
deal with generating new knowledge: research, development, and the introduction of innova-
tive products and processes.2 These activities are fundamental to the long-run performance of 
any economic system. 
For all these reasons, the study of firm financial constraints on a micro level is major topic on 
the agenda of central bank research. A recent co-ordinated research effort by the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB) utilised large national balance sheet databases to show that 
financial constraints do seem to matter for firm investment and the monetary transmission 
process (see Chatelain, Generale, Hernando, von Kalckreuth and Vermeulen (2003) for an 
overview). However, unlike much of the literature on US firms, size does not seem to be a 
good indicator of informational asymmetries and the assorted financial constraints in Euro-
pean countries. Among some of the larger euro area countries – France, Germany, Italy and 
                                                 
1   This paper was written while the first-named author was seconded at the Bank of England. He is grateful for 
the warm hospitality he received, the stimulating intellectual environment in London, and for generous sup-
port given by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Encouragement and support by Charles Bean, Peter Brierley, Heinz 
Herrmann, and Garry Young were pivotal in making the project possible. The CBI gave us access to their 
rich micro data base, and we would like to thank, in particular, Ian McCafferty, Jonathan Wood and Jamie 
Morrison for their crucial help. Ongoing discussions with many people were productive. Thanks are therefore 
due to Nick Bloom, Steve Bond, Harald Stahl, Christian Upper, Geoffrey Wood, Garry Young and Mike 
Young. We are also grateful for important comments on presentations at the Bank of England in London, at 
the BIS in Basel, at the Deutsche Bundesbank in Frankfurt and at the CESifo institute in Munich.  
2   See, for example, Hall (2002). The argument was made as early as 1963 by Kenneth Arrow, already using 
explicitly a moral hazard argument. Demsetz’ (1969) critique makes plain that informational inefficiencies by 
themselves do not create a case for government intervention – the market fails with respect to a nirvana 
situation of perfect informational symmetry. See also Stigler (1967).   4 
Spain – only Italian small firms show an excess sensitivity of investment with respect to cash 
flow.3  
It is conceivable that the importance of financial constraints for the real activity of firms also 
depends on the financial system. Allen and Gale (2001) argue that intermediaries and markets 
may have different comparative advantages. A market-based system deals better with situa-
tions where innovations occur and where there is a fundamental diversity of opinion, whereas 
intermediaries are able to save transaction costs when a large amount of experience has been 
gained and things are no longer changing. The empirical patterns of financial constraints and 
their importance for monetary policy, financial stability and innovation and growth may there-
fore depend on economic institutions.  
This paper is part of a larger research effort based on large panels of survey data, which aims 
to compare the significance of financial constraints for firm behaviour in bank-based Ger-
many and the capital market based UK. With respect to the UK, we are able to explore the 
data base for the CBI Industrial Trends Survey (ITS), which is an important survey for 
business cycle analysis in the United Kingdom. For the 11 years between January 1989 and 
October 1999, our cleaned unbalanced panel contains 49,244 quarterly observations on 5,196 
firms. According to the CBI, the ITS represents around 33% of the total current employment 
within UK manufacturing.  
Apart from its size and coverage, the data-set has two important characteristics. First, it con-
tains many small firms, on which very little information i s available from micro data-sets 
based on quoted companies. More than 63% of the ITS observations refer to firms with less 
than 200 employees. Second, the data-set contains detailed information on the financial con-
straints that firms face in their investment decisions. Notably, a number of firms (around 
20.8% of respondents) explicitly state two things: that they are constrained by the lack of ei-
ther internal or external financial resources, and that these constraints have an influence on 
their investment behaviour.  
This is exactly what the bulk of the empirical literature on financial constraints, following the 
seminal article by Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988), tries to prove. The standard proce-
dure in this literature is to split the sample by some criterion that a priori identifies firms as 
being financially constrained or unconstrained, such as size, dividend behaviour or the risk of 
default, and then to test whether the observed differences in investment behaviour between 
the two types of firm are consistent with what is to be expected by a better or worse financial 
                                                 
3   The key results have been collected in Angeloni, Kasyhap and Mojon (eds., 2003): see Chatelain and Tiomo 
(2003) on France, von Kalckreuth (2003b) on Germany, Gaiotti and Generale (2003) on Italy, as well as 
Chatelain, Generale, Hernando, von Kalckreuth and Vermeulen (2003b) for a comparative study of the euro 
area. On Germany, see also the studies by Chirinko and von Kalckreuth (2003) and Breitung, Chirinko and 
von Kalckreuth (2003).   5 
standing in a situation of asymmetric information.4 Armed with the CBI data, this compli-
cated and very indirect procedure, heavily criticised on theoretical grounds by Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997, 2000), seems to be unnecessary: a subset of respondents explicitly claim to be 
constrained. However, it needs to be examined whether they have told the truth, i.e. whether 
or not there is informational content in their assertions. If this is the case, we have the chance 
to take a closer look at the interrelationship between financial constraints and investment 
demand.  
We start out by describing the financing environment for small firms in the UK (Section 2). 
Small firms are deemed to be especially vulnerable to financing constraints. During the 1980s 
and early 1990s, the availability of credit for small firms in the UK was generally regarded as 
unsatisfactory, a state of affairs that led to considerable political repercussions. Since then, 
with the upturn in the 1990s, the situation appears to have eased. A thorough analysis, how-
ever, still has to confront a dearth of reliable micro data, which is one of the things this study 
aims to help overcome.  
The next part, Section 3, is dedicated to the presentation of our data-set. The raw percentages 
do not show small firms as being particularly strongly affected by financial constraints. Al-
though the severest form of financial constraints – inability to raise external finance – is more 
prevalent among small firms (5.1% compared with 3.0% for the other size groups), the share 
of small firms reporting inadequate internal finance is actually slightly smaller (18.2% as 
against 20.4% for all other size groups). 
Part 4 of our paper examines the informational content of our data on financial constraints. 
Our focus is on capacity adjustment, as the ITS data on capacity gaps, planned expansion and 
rates of capacity utilisation are especially rich. First, we look at the association between two 
types of constraints: capacity restrictions and financial constraints, and then we undertake a 
duration analysis with respect to spells of capacity constraints. Firms report whether their ca-
pacity is insufficient with respect to demand. Those firms which indicate financial constraints 
should take longer to close a capacity gap if there is informational content in their answers – 
either because they are less able to finance their investments or else because they have bigger 
gaps to fill.  
For both size classes, we find a clear contemporaneous association between the two types of 
constraints. With respect to duration, financially constrained firms do take longer to end a pe-
riod of insufficient capacity. However, splitting the sample shows that the latter relationship is 
statistically significant only for small firms. For larger firms, the measured difference in dura-
tion is less marked and not significant at conventional levels. It is quite interesting to see that 
                                                 
4   See, for example, Chirinko and von Kalckreuth (2002).   6 
small firms appear to be able to overcome their capacity shortfalls faster than larger firms - 
both in general and conditional on their financial status. The paper ends with a conclusion in 
Section 5. 
2. The financing environment for small firms in the UK 
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) form an important part of the British economy. 
They account for almost 54% of gross value added in the economy, excluding the public sec-
tor, and almost 40% of net capital expenditure.5 In some sectors, the productivity of SMEs 
exceeds that of larger firms.6 SMEs also account for 56% of employment and 52% of turn-
over.7 Historically, however, they have faced particular problems in accessing finance. Every 
UK government in recent times has laid special emphasis on developing the SME sector as an 
engine of both growth and productivity. Despite the rapid growth of the British SME sector 
since the 1970s, rates of entrepreneurial activity remain only moderate in international terms. 
In particular, the UK appears to lag behind the US in terms of high growth start-ups. Access 
to finance, especially risk capital, is felt to be one of the key barriers and it is deemed impor-
tant to ensure that there is an effective supply of finance for this sector.8 
The political interest in the topic has spawned academic research. Hughes (1994)9 considers 
the comparative financial structures and profitability of large and small companies between 
1987 and 1989. He recognises a number of important differences in the financial structure 
between larger and smaller firms in the UK during this time. Small companies were more 
highly geared, more reliant on short-term bank debt and less profitable than larger firms. 
Hughes believes these features represented either a chronic market failure constraining small 
firms to a sub-optimal position, or a financial structure reflecting optimal choice, or some 
combination of the two. Traditionally, economists have argued that such financial structures 
are due to market imperfections which arise mainly as a result of information asymmetries.10 
The owner of a small business generally has much better information than the bank on his 
firms’ performance, and has more control of the outcome. These asymmetries may lead to: (i) 
adverse selection where banks find it difficult to use the price mechanism to distinguish be-
tween firms; and (ii) moral hazard where, in the absence of collateral, use of higher interest 
rates by banks to offset risk would give firms an incentive to alter their behaviour to adopt 
more risky projects. In the light of the model set up by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), it has been 
                                                 
5    See Bank of England (2003). 
6   See Bank of England (2003) 
7    See Small Business Service (2003), www.sbs.gov.uk/statistics SME statistics for the UK (2002), Table 3, All 
industries. 
8    See HM Treasury/Small Business Service (2003). 
9   See Hughes (1994) or Cosh and Hughes (1994) for further details. 
10  Imperfections are also said to arise from agency costs, bankruptcy costs, appraisal and monitoring problems 
and an illiquid equity market.   7 
argued that such problems lead to credit rationing for small firms – that is, finance is not made 
available to all firms with viable projects whose net present value is positive. Owing to the 
asymmetry of information between banks and small firms, markets are not cleared through the 
price mechanism, and banks have an incentive to respond to an increased demand in loans by 
rationing credit rather than by raising interest rates. 
Empirical evidence of such failures remains mixed. A report by ACOST11 in 1990 asserts that 
qualitative evidence supports the view that the observed capital structure of some small firms 
was due to supply side failures. However, most other evidence provides little conclusive sup-
port of such market imperfections in the financing of small firms in the United Kingdom in 
general.12 The financial structure of small firms is seen by many as due predominantly to the 
optimal choice of owner/managers. Norton (1990) believes that managerial beliefs and desires 
play a key role in determining a small firm’s capital structure and that management perception 
of a target debt ratio and perceptions of the trade-offs involved in external financing will de-
termine the actual mix of debt and equity used. Smaller companies have lower fixed  in-
vestment and avoid external finance owing to differences in growth strategies and so, in ef-
fect, stay small by choice. This is reinforced by anecdotal evidence of debt aversion among 
small firms, especially following the recession in the early 1990s.13 Mason and Harrison 
(2001) recently investigated the investment readiness of small firms and their results show an 
aversion to ceding control via the dilution of equity. Hay and Morris (1984) maintain that the 
lower fixed asset proportion reflects a choice of flexible production methods whilst the struc-
ture of long and short-term liabilities may reflect a desire to maintain maximum freedom from 
external interference. Aghion and Bolton (1992) argue that the wealth-constrained owners 
place an intrinsic value on ownership, so standard debt financing may therefore be the best 
way to implement control arrangements.  
Throughout the 1990s, trends in small firms financing suggest that there was a steady im-
provement in how finance providers service the market and there were fairly major changes in 
small firms financing patterns. One change has been that small firms have, in the aggregate, 
become markedly less dependent on external finance. Recently published research14 shows 
that only 39% of small firms sought external finance of any kind between 2000 and 2002, 
compared with 65% between 1987 and 1990 and that access to finance is rarely mentioned by 
small firms as a major barrier to growth. For those small firms that do access external finance, 
the proportion accounted for by bank finance has declined. This partly reflects a shift towards 
factoring and asset-based finance. However, it also reflects an absolute decline in the net in-
                                                 
11  See Advisory Council on Science and Technology (1990). 
12 However, supply side problems are seen as more relevant to particular types of SME such as innovative, 
technology based firms or those with a substantial product development timescale.  
13  See Bank of England (1998). 
14  See Cosh and Hughes (2003).   8 
debtedness of the sector. Furthermore, total small business deposits at banks have been greater 
than total lending to the sector since 1997. These findings have been corroborated by work 
from the Manchester Business School15 showing that the average gearing levels of small, pri-
vately held firms fell between 1992 and 1996. This development may well represent a return 
to normality. 
In our work, we want to focus on an aspect of the problem that has been neglected hitherto. It 
may well be that the financial structures of small and large firms differ considerably, but do 
these differences really reflect binding constraints? Do financial constraints matter for firm 
behaviour? Our database contains self-assessments on the financial limits to investment, and 
we can combine this information with rich data on the firms’ real activity. 
3. The data-set 
3.1. The CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
The CBI Industrial Trends Survey (ITS) is a qualitative survey that looks at short and me-
dium-term trends in the UK manufacturing and processing industries. By excluding all sea-
sonal variations, its questions focus on recent and imminent trends in order to allow for direct 
measures of business perceptions and expectations. The survey is a postal questionnaire aimed 
at a senior level within firms and is usually completed by either the Chairman or the Chief 
Executive. The CBI produces both a monthly and quarterly survey, the latter providing more 
in-depth analysis. It covers a wide range of subject areas including optimism regarding the 
general and export business situation, investment, capacity, order books, numbers employed, 
output, deliveries, stocks, prices, constraints to output, export orders and on investment, com-
petitiveness regarding domestic, EU and non-EU market, innovation and training. The quar-
terly survey is the empirical basis for our analysis. Mitchell, Smith and Weale (2002a and b) 
have used the ITS micro data to show that disaggregate survey based indicators they 
developed can outperform traditional aggregate indicators. The full text of the questionnaire 
can be found in Wood (2001).  
According to the CBI, the ITS represents around 33% of the total current employment within 
UK manufacturing. Our investigation focuses on 11 years of data between January 1989 and 
October 1999. The cleaned, unbalanced panel contains 49,244 quarterly observations on 5,169 
firms. We exclude any divisions of a company, as their information might not be truly rele-
vant to questions relating to size or financial constraints. Furthermore, we exclude all 
anonymous responses because these companies cannot be tracked over time. For these rea-
sons, our descriptive statistics are not identical to the results published by the CBI. 
                                                 
15  See Chittenden, Michaelas and Poutziouris (1999).   9 
Apart from its size and coverage, the data-set has a number of important characteristics. First, 
the survey consists of four employment size groups, the largest of which looks at small firms 
with less than 199 employees. As can be seen in Table 1, 63% of the ITS observations refer to 
these small firms. This is extremely valuable, as very little information is available from other 
micro data-sets, which are generally based on larger, quoted companies. The CBI uses these 
data to produce a report entitled the  Quarterly SME Trends Survey, one of the most 
comprehensive specialist surveys in the SME field. Second, the ITS has a wide-ranging base 
of firms from the UK manufacturing and processing industries and Table 2 shows the 
breakdown of two-digit SIC codes by observation. 
3.2 Summary descriptive statistics 
In order to compare the experience and constraints of small and larger firms, we simplify the 
size categories further, classifying as ‘small’ those firms with fewer than 199 employees and 
as ‘large’ all those with 200 employees and more. This has the effect of smoothing some of 
the larger firms’ experiences. This is particularly true of the data from those firms with 5,000 
and more employees. However, although the data from this size category is the most volatile, 
it is also based on the fewest observations. All figures within the respective size categories are 
simple, unweighted averages.  
Optimism  
One of the most widely reported questions in the ITS looks at the optimism firms’ feel about 
the general business situation in their respective industry: Are you more, or less, optimistic 
than you were four months ago about the general business situation in your industry? The 
results are shown in Chart 1. In addition to the difference between the share of firms with a 
positive and a negative outlook, the graph shows the percentage change in the manufacturing 
production index, at constant prices of 2000. It can be seen that the optimism data reflects the 
general business cycle for the manufacturing sector fairly well. Eyeballing suggests that 
manufacturing output and optimism are roughly coincident. It is perhaps surprising that the 
data from the business optimism question of the survey show so few differences between 
small and large firms. Essentially, the two time series seem to measure the same process. 
Since January 1995 the data have diverged to a marginally greater extent, with small firms 
entering the last business cycle downturn slightly earlier than large firms and exiting it 
slightly later. With a mean optimism rating of –0.075 for small firms compared with –0.085 
for larger firms, the overall levels are almost identical (see Table 3).    10 
Output 
Question 4 of the survey reads: Is your present level of output below capacity (ie are you 
working below a satisfactory full rate of operation)? Small firms in the survey were more 
likely to state that their present level of output was currently below capacity than were large 
firms. Over the entire data-set, 59% of small firms believed their output was currently below 
full capacity, compared with 56% of large firms. As can be seen in Chart 2, small firms’ trend 
over time was consistently lower than that of large firms and has remained largely negative. 
Of the factors named by firms as likely to limit their output over the next four months (Survey 
Question 14), by far the most important was orders or sales, with over 80% of both small and 
large firms citing this particular factor (Chart 3). Lack of skilled labour was a slightly more 
significant factor for small firms than for large firms, whilst plant capacity was marginally 
more important to large firms. Credit and finance was mentioned rarely by both sets of firms, 
although small firms did show a higher propensity to cite this factor with a figure of 6% of 
small firms compared with 3% of large firms. 
Total orders 
The ITS allows to analyse whether the order books of small and large firms are above or be-
low normal in volume terms. Chart 4 plots the answers to Survey Question 5a. Both sets of 
firms generally seem to feel that their present order book is below normal in volume terms. 
This raises the question of what firms consider normal. Possibly, the respondents' norm is re-
lated to capacity. Small firms consistently feel more negative about their order books than do 
large firms. This is reflected in small firms having a lower overall mean value of –0.306, 
compared to large firms with a value of –0.251. It is interesting to see how closely Charts 2 
and 4 correlate with the trend in business optimism shown in Chart 1; all three of these charts 
track the wider economic business cycle. 
Investment intentions 
In Survey Question 3, the ITS asks about respondents’ intentions for both buildings and plant 
and machinery investment over the coming 12 months compared with the preceding 12 
months. As can be seen in Chart 5, intentions regarding buildings investment remains largely 
negative for both small and large firms throughout the period, and both sets of data behave in 
a broadly similar manner. However, Chart 6 shows firms’ intentions regarding investment in 
plant and machinery is more volatile and small firms do show differences from larger firms. 
Although they also track each closely, large firms appear to be more positive about their in-
vestment intentions than are small firms.   11 
Motivation for capital expenditure  
Table 4 lists the main purposes that firms cite for their investment expenditures, as an answer 
to question 16b. As can be seen from the table, small firms cite the intention to increase effi-
ciency considerably less than do larger firms, with only 46% ranking it as the most important 
reason for capital expenditure compared with 59% of larger firms. 
Instead, small firms cite replacement as a more important factor for capital expenditure than 
larger firms. It is noticeable that a sizeably higher proportion of smaller firms mention ‘not 
applicable’ than is the case for large firms. This could reflect indivisibilities, especially for 
large-scale capital expenditure, where small firms will invest sporadically and will have many 
periods where they do not invest at all. 
Constraints on capital expenditure 
The question on constraints on investment is of key importance for our study. We therefore 
quote the exact wording here for the sake of convenience:  
Question 16c: What factors are likely to limit (wholly or partly) your capital expendi-
ture authorisation over the next twelve months?  
(If you tick more than one factor, please rank in order of importance) 
?  inadequate net return on proposed investment 
?  shortage of internal finance 
?  inability to raise external finance 
?  cost of finance 
?  uncertainty about demand 
?  shortage of labour, including managerial and technical staff 
?  other 
?  n/a 
Table 5 shows both the overall frequency with which firms cite a given constraint (any rank) 
to investment expenditure and the frequency with which this constraint was given the first 
rank. Firms had the opportunity to name more than one constraint on capital expenditure, but 
they were asked to rank the importance of their constraints. We interpret the answers to this 
question as information on marginal investment. For the entire sample, uncertainty about de-
mand is the most common impediment mentioned by all firms. It is cited as the most signifi-
cant constraint by 55% of all firms over the time period we studied. An interpretation of these 
figures in the light of theory, however, has to take into account the possibility that many firms 
focus only on ‘downside risks’, such as an unanticipated decrease in demand, rather than on 
uncertainty in the sense of imprecise expectations. For a recent review on the micro-
econometric literature on investment and uncertainty see von Kalckreuth (2003a). The second 
most important constraint is inadequate net return, ranked by 39% of firms as their number   12 
one constraint. Other constraints seem to have been less important. Costs of finance was cited 
frequently in the early 1990s, but have been mentioned significantly less often since then. 
Table 5 also breaks down the complete data-set into small and large firms. These size classes 
show a number of differences in the importance given to the surveyed factors that could limit 
a firm’s capital expenditure. Demand uncertainty seems to be a more important issue for 
smaller firms than it is for larger firms. This is not implausible: a firm which combines many 
imperfectly correlated activities will find its overall demand less volatile than does a firm with 
a smaller number of activities. Furthermore, it is conceivable that small firms are used to meet 
peak demands in larger firms' order books and are cut out when orders fall. We also see that 
inadequate net return seems to bother large firms more than small firms.  
Turning to financial issues, we see that 5.1% of small firms cite the inability to raise external 
finance as a factor likely to limit their capital expenditure over the next 12 months. However, 
it is also interesting to note that only 2.3% mentioned this particular factor as their foremost 
constraint. This compares with figures of 3.0% and 1.4% respectively in the case of large 
firms. Therefore, although this severest form of financial constraint is more prevalent amongst 
small firms, the proportion affected is very low. Overall, it was the restraint least commonly 
cited by small firms. 
Small firms cite the shortage of internal finance less commonly than do large firms, with only 
18.1% of small firms mentioning internal finance as a limiting factor compared with 20.2% of 
large firms. A finer breakdown (not shown) reveals that almost 30% of the firms in the largest 
size category, with 5000 employees and over, claim to be constrained by the shortage of in-
ternal finance. This is somewhat surprising, but it is not impossible that the pressure for high 
and regular dividends is felt especially strongly by the larger quoted companies. On the other 
hand, some small firms might find it easier to draw on the private wealth of their owners in 
the event of liquidity shortages. The cost of finance is a concern for both small and large 
firms, with a slightly higher proportion of small firms citing it as their main limiting factor. 
Although all the financial constraints on investment in the survey rank lower in importance 
for both small and large firms than do uncertainty about demand and an inadequate net return 
on proposed investment, it is interesting to look at the trend of such variables over time. As 
mentioned above, concerns about the cost of finance decreased dramatically for both catego-
ries of firms after the last recession in the early 1990s. This is especially noticeable for small 
firms, as 19% of small firms cited cost of finance as their main constraint on investment in 
January 1990 compared to only 3% in January 1993. By contrast, a shortage of internal fi-
nance appeared to peak as a concern for small firms in the mid-1990s and has become rela-
tively less important for larger firms in recent years when compared with the early quarters in 
the data-set. This result should be interpreted in the light of the higher investment demand 
seen during the mid-1990s (see Chart 8) – if investment demand is large, constraints imposed   13 
by internal finance are more likely to be binding. Concern about the inability to raise external 
finance has remained largely constant for both large and small firms, generally being men-
tioned by 2% to 3% of small firms throughout the 43 quarters covered by our data-set. 
For inferential purposes, it is important to know whether there is sizeable individual variation 
in the financing constraints data. Table 6 conditions on whether in the preceding period a firm 
reported either shortage of internal finance or inability to raise external finance, and it shows 
the transition to the next period. It is easy to see that the reports on financial constraints are 
strongly autocorrelated. Among the firms that do not report financial constraints in a given 
period, a share of 87.6% will continue to do so in the next period, and 12.4% switch to re-
porting constraints. But only 33.3% of the firms that report financial constraints in one period 
will state that they are unconstrained next time, the remaining two-thirds will claim to be still 
constrained. However, the state of financial constraints is far from being determined by the 
state in the preceding period – there is lot of individual movement in both directions. 
4. Is there informational content in the financial constraints data? 
As highlighted in Section 3, a sizeable proportion of firms in the CBI Industrial Trends Sur-
vey state that their investment is constrained either by insufficient internal funds or by the in-
ability to raise external finance. These statements are interesting and potentially very rich: as 
we shall see below, they permit the identification of the financial regime of a firm. Weighted 
averages of survey questions are often used for forecasting and evaluation purposes on a sec-
toral or macro level and in many cases turn out to be surprisingly accurate (see, for example, 
Chart 1 for the question on general optimism). Mitchell, Smith and Weale (2002a, b) show 
that survey responses contain information that is useful in generating indicators of 
manufacturing output ahead of the publication of survey data. Furthermore, they show that 
disaggregate indicators for output growth can outperform traditional aggregate measures with 
respect to their predictive content. However, it is not clear a priori how well the survey 
responses reflect the individual financial situation of the answering firm. Therefore, it is 
necessary to check the informational content of the statements on financial constraints at a 
micro level. In other words, we want to see whether the statements on financial constraints 
relate to other information in the data-set in a way that is consistent with theory.  
4.1. The endogeneity problem 
This, however, is no easy task. Capital accumulation and financial constraints are determined 
simultaneously: financial constraints depend not only on the financial situation of the firm, 
but also on the size of the planned investment.  
With complete markets and a type of uncertainty common to all agents, the net present value 
of a firm does not depend on the way it is financed. The Modigliani-Miller separation theorem   14 
holds that a firm’s real capital allocation decision can be analysed independently of the fi-
nancing decision – the structure of the asset side of the balance sheet is independent of the 
liability side. With asymmetric information, however, there will be a premium on external 
financing over and above a fair default premium which simply compensates for the fact that 
the debtor will not have to pay in certain states of nature. The creditor is less able than the 
debtor to evaluate the situation of the firm and the prospects of the investment project to be 
financed. The finance premium covers expected dead-weight losses caused by monitoring, 
costs of litigation, adverse selection and moral hazard. The important thing is that its size de-
pends on the financial structure of the firm. Investment and the cost of external finance there-
fore are jointly endogenous.  
Graph 1, adapted from Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), shows that the costs of exter-
nal finance depend on the difference between the actual capital demand and what can be fi-
nanced internally. By means of this graph, we can interpret the responses to the questions on 
financial constraints in terms of three regimes which are ordered in a natural way: a state of 
no financial constraints, a state of limited internal finance (the firm needing external finance) 
and a state of unavailability of external finance. If a firm states that its capital expenditure 
authorisations are limited by a shortage of internal finance, it is saying that it has to pay an 
external finance premium because the internal resources are insufficient. And if it reports that 
no further external finance can be raised, the firm may find itself in the regime described by 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981): at a certain credit volume, the credit supply function becomes 
completely inelastic with respect to the interest rate. Then the firm is credit-rationed. Under 
certain circumstances, this is the equilibrium outcome of a situation where the severity of the 
agency problems is a function of the interest rate itself. In the graph, the possible existence of 
such a regime is accounted for by the vertical portion of the supply curve. 
We see that shocks to the financial structure will affect real decisions and vice versa. In any 
equation describing the capital accumulation decision, the error term will be correlated with 
the financial constraints variable. If we had continuous variables describing the accumulation 
of capital, this problem could be resolved using instrumental variables techniques, such as the 
GMM method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Breitung, Chirinko  and von 
Kalckreuth (2003) explore the simultaneity between investment decision and financial condi-
tions by estimating a VAR on a large panel of German manufacturing firms. However, In-
strumental Variable analysis is made difficult by the fact that the ITS data on investment and 
expansion are qualitative: we know whether or not the firm expands or steps up investment, 
but not by how much.  
We therefore want to test the informational content of the data on financial constraints by 
looking at a relationship where both lines of causality point in the same direction. To this end, 
we investigate the occurrence and the duration of spells of capacity constraints.   15 
4.2. Occurrence and duration of capacity restrictions 
If there are adaptation costs such as delivery lags or time to build constraints, the move to a 
higher desired capital stock will be spread over several periods. In order to achieve tractabil-
ity, it is often assumed that marginal adaptation costs increase linearly with the size of in-
vestment.16 Second, the external finance premium might also be an increasing function of the 
investment intensity. Creditors might want to give finance in instalments, cutting the project 
into several phases, in order to monitor feasibility and the willingness of the management to 
comply with the terms of the credit contract. This may induce a sequential and ‘evolutionary’ 
development of a project from a smaller to a larger size even in cases where in a world with-
out information asymmetry a massive parallel investment effort might have been optimal. In 
the extreme case, when a firm has no access to external finance, the amount of investment per 
period is quite simply limited by the firm’s cash flow. 
The ITS survey gives us information on whether or not a firm experiences capacity con-
straints in a given period by asking the following question:  
Question 14: What factors are likely to limit your output over the next four months? 
(please leave completely blank if you have no limits to output) 
 
? orders or sales  ? skilled labour  ? other labour   ? plant capacity 
? credit or finance  ? materials or components       ? other 
Both directions of causation between financial constraints and the expansion decision lead us 
to predict that a state of capacity restrictions is more probable and will be of longer duration if 
the respondent also reports financial constraints to investment. With a given marginal valua-
tion of capital, a large external finance premium will induce the firm to spread investment 
over a longer time horizon, inducing and prolonging capacity constraints. On the other hand, 
with a given financial structure, a shock in the marginal valuation function will not only trig-
ger financial constraints, but also lead to a longer adaptation process. Larger gaps simply take 
more time to fill. Below, we shall compare the occurrence and duration of capacity constraints 
for restricted and unrestricted financing, with a particular emphasis on the distinction between 
small and large firms. Our analysis shows that the financial constraints data actually do have 
informational content on the micro level. 
The econometric analysis of duration data began only in the late 1970s’ (see Heckman and 
Singer (1984), Kiefer (1988), and Lancaster (1990) for overviews). Not only the statistical 
models, but also a good part of the terminology, have been borrowed from biostatistics. The 
classical focus of ‘survival analysis’ is the evaluation of survival times of human patients or 
                                                 
16  See Hayashi’s (1982) neoclassical micro-foundation of the Q model.   16 
animals after the contraction of a specific disease, with the aim of testing the effects of medi-
cal treatments and other factors that might potentially be of relevance. Among the economic 
applications have been the analysis of the duration of unemployment, for example, by Steiner 
(1990), or of fiscal behaviour, as in the study by von Hagen, Hughes-Hallet and Strauch 
(2001). To the best of our knowledge, the duration of capacity constraints has never been in-
vestigated before on a micro-econometric level. This makes our exercise interesting and 
worthwhile in its own right, as capacity constraints may play an important role in the propa-
gation of inflationary shocks.17  
4.3 Association analysis for capacity restrictions and financial constraints 
Table 7 compares the frequency of capacity restrictions for three groups of firms: those that 
do not seem to be limited by the lack of either internal or external finance (Group 1), those 
that complain about shortages of internal finance but not about the inability to raise external 
finance (Group 2) and, finally, those that report being rationed on the market for external fi-
nance (Group 3). Whereas only 12.99% of the first group claims to be capacity restricted, the 
corresponding figures are 22.52% of the second group and 19.17% of the third group. The 
two latter groups are clearly different from the first group. We perform three statistical tests of 
association: the well known Pearson test, a likelihood ratio test and Fisher's exact test, and all 
reject the null hypothesis of independence with a p-value of less than 0.0005.18 The picture 
we can gather from comparing small and large firm in this respect (not shown) is essentially 
similar.  
It is also interesting to look at changes of states, as the association between the levels of the 
financial constraints and capacity restrictions might be the result of a special sensitivity to 
constraints in general on part of the individual respondents. To put it differently: some indi-
viduals might have a special propensity to complain. Therefore we want to condition on the 
state of capacity restrictions in the preceding period. This examination also prepares our du-
ration analysis: by definition, a switch from the state of not restricted to restricted initiates a 
spell of restricted capacity. If the restricted state is maintained, the spell goes on, and a reverse 
switch will end it.  
Table 8 performs the three above-mentioned non-parametric association tests separately for 
firms that reported capacity restrictions in the preceding period and those that did not. Gener-
                                                 
17  See, for example, Macklem (1997). 
18  Given two discrete (multinomial) variables, all three tests focus on how strongly the realised shares for one 
variable, conditional on the values that the other variable may take, deviates from the overall shares. Pear-
son's test and the likelihood ratio test are easily calculated and rely on asymptotic properties of the test statis-
tic: for large numbers their distribution converges against the Chi(2) with (r-1)(s-1) degrees of freedom, r 
being the number of rows and s being the number of columns in the contingency tables. Fisher's test exploits 
the exact distribution of the test statistic, but computation can take a very long time for larger tables. See, for 
example, Büning and Trenkler (1994) or any other book on non-parametric statistics.    17 
ally, capacity restrictions are cited much more frequently when there were restrictions in the 
previous quarter: Whereas only 7.2% of the unrestricted firms switch to the restricted state, 
53.3% of the restricted firms remain restricted. However, under both conditions the probabil-
ity of capacity restrictions clearly becomes higher when financial constraints are present. 
Again, the three association tests mentioned above reject the null hypothesis of independence 
with a p-value of less than 0.0005.  
Tables 9 and 10 reveal an interesting difference between large and small firms. Among the 
firms that were unconstrained in the previous period, there is no clear size differential. But 
among the constrained firms, a large firm will stay constrained with a probability of 
57.8%,(Table 10, lower half), whereas it is only 49.9% for small firms (Table 9, lower half). 
A closer inspection of the two tables shows that most of that difference is due to different 
conditional probabilities of capacity constraints when there are no financial restrictions. This 
might indicate that the duration of capacity constraints is shorter for small firms. A formal 
duration analysis can tell whether this is true. 
4.4. The design of the duration analysis 
We now proceed to consider the duration of states of restricted capacity. For a firm in this 
state, the probability of switching to the unrestricted state may depend on the duration that is 
already achieved. Such a conditioning on time is called ‘ageing’, and the word itself makes 
the idea plain. Mortality among human beings is relatively high during the first months of life, 
and then drops sharply after a couple of years. In advanced age, mortality rises again and 
reaches extreme levels at the right end of the scale.  
In order to estimate survival curves, we therefore need to have information on the time when 
the period of constrained capacity began. We limit ourselves to contiguous strings of obser-
vations that start with a switch of the capacity restrictions variable from zero (no capacity re-
strictions reported) to one (output is likely to be limited by plant capacity during the next four 
months). The string is interrupted if either the state is left, i.e. the ‘spell’ ends, or else if there 
is no further information on the firm. One missing survey is enough to cut the string off. For 
inferential reasons, we can use only those observations which are not censored immediately 
after entry. That is, after the initial switch from zero to one, we need at least one more con-
secutive observation on the firm if the string is to contain any information on duration other 
than that it was non-negative. The cleaned CBI survey data for the period between January 
1989 and November 1999 contain 49,244 observations on 5,169 firms. In this data-set, we 
observe 1,431 of such strings, with a total of 5,153 observations,19 taken from 862 firms.  
                                                 
19  This number of observations includes the initial zero and the initial 1 for each string.   18 
We need to pay special attention to three important features of our data-set. First, our duration 
data are censored considerably. From our 1,431 cases, we observe the end of the spell 1,210 
times, but in the remaining 221 spells the string is cut off by missing observations. In these 
cases, we know that the spell has lasted at least until the end of the string, and this informa-
tion has to be used appropriately. Second, we have grouped data. We do not observe the end 
of the spell in continuous time, but only know that it falls in an interval between two discrete 
points of time. Our observations are quarterly, and the vast majority of observed periods of 
capacity constraints are less than four quarters. This means that the granularity of our obser-
vations is rather high, and we believe that it would not be correct to use standard models and 
estimation procedures which assume observed duration times to be continuously distributed in 
time. Third, as already stated, we are working with a panel of survival time data. For many 
firms, we observe more than one spell. These cannot be assumed to be stochastically inde-
pendent, and special care has to be taken with testing procedures. 
4.5. Kaplan-Maier survival curves 
We start by looking at the estimated survivor functions. A survivor function is defined both 
for discrete and continuous distributions by the probability that the duration T exceeds a value 
t in its range, that is 
  ( ) ( ) ¥ < < > = t t T P t F 0 ,  .              (1) 
For each hypothetical duration t, the survivor function gives the share of individuals with du-
ration of t or more. In our context, the survivor function depicts the process of firms liberating 
themselves from capacity constraints, once they have entered into this state. The survivor 
function gives the mass on the right tail of the distribution of duration times. This is conven-
ient, because the right tail is the important component for the incorporation of right censoring. 
The Kaplan-Meier20 (or product limit) estimator is a non-parametric maximum likelihood es-
timator of the survivor function. The estimator is given by 
( ) j
t j
t F l ˆ 1 ˆ - =P
£





= l ˆ  .            (2) 
The index j enumerates observed times to completion, i.e. time spans passed since the obser-
vational unit entered into the risk pool. We only observe firms at discrete intervals, therefore 
the j can be thought of as quarters. The  j l ˆ  are estimated probabilities for the observational 
unit to complete at j, given that it has reached j-1, the last observed time to completion. The 
estimate of this conditional probabilities is obtained by dividing the observed number of com-
                                                 
20 For the derivation of the Kaplan-Meier estimator as a maximum likelihood estimator, see Kalbfleisch and 
Prentice (2002) and the Appendix to this paper.   19 
pletions, dj, by the number of observational units that have neither completed nor been cen-
sored before j.  
As can be seen, the survivor function is estimated recursively. The expression  ( ) l ˆ 1-  is an 
estimation of the conditional probability that an individual ‘survives’ in the state, given that it 
has lasted until j–1. The unconditional probability that the duration is at least j is then com-
puted as a product of all the contemporaneous and prior conditional survival probabilities. For 
this estimate to be unbiased, the censoring mechanism needs to be independent, that is, the 
completion probabilities of non-censored and censored individuals must be identical. This 
will be assumed throughout below.  
Table 11 not only describes termination and censoring over time, but also gives the numerical 
values for the survivorship and completion rates in the entire sample. The first column, time, 
is the number of quarters after the original switch from unconstrained to constrained. If, for 
example, the capacity state of a firm switches from unrestricted to restricted in the third quar-
ter 1991, then for this firm the fourth quarter 1991 assumes the value of 1. The second column 
gives the number of firms ‘at risk’, for which we have information in this quarter. The third 
column gives the number of completions, the fourth column the number of firms censored in 
this quarter, on which there is no further information thereafter. The sixth column is the esti-
mated Kaplan-Meier survivor function, based on the estimated hazard rates in the fifth col-
umn according to Equation (2). According to this estimate, about 40% of firms that start out 
with capacity constraints remain in this state for more than one quarter, 20% for more than 
two quarters, etc. After the fifth quarter, the survivor function has dropped to 6.4%. The long-
est observed duration is completed after 13 quarters. Completion probabilities seem to be fal-
ling, i.e. there is negative age dependence. The more time a firm has spent in a state of con-
strained capacity, the less likely it is to leave in the next quarter. The size of the sample, on 
which duration information is based, decreases rapidly with time. After the fifth quarter, not 
more than 3.7% of the original set of firms is left in the sample. It therefore seems inappropri-
ate to draw any conclusions from survival times larger than that. The last column gives the 
standard deviation of the survivor function, taking into account the stochastic dependence of 
the duration experiences for a given firm. The standard deviations are simulated on the basis 
of a maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters – see the Appendix to this paper – us-
ing 20,000 replications. Numerically, they differ only very slightly from what is obtained as-
suming all duration experiences to be independent. The curve of the survival function given in 
Table 11 is plotted as Graph 2 
We want to compare the survivor experiences for various sub-samples. The relative sizes of 
the groups and some global statistics are given in Table 12. Graph 3 compares the duration 
experiences of small and large firms. Among the total number of capacity constraints experi-
ences, 887 were by small firms (with less than 200 employees) and 544 by large firms (200   20 
employees and more). The survival curve of small firms is always beneath that of the larger 
firms. That is, large firms take longer than small firms to complete their spells of capacity 
constraints.  
It is interesting to speculate about possible reasons. One explanation is that larger firms might 
be hit by (disproportionately) larger demand shocks. This does not seem immediately plausi-
ble; the law of large numbers should help to even out demand volatility for firms with larger 
and more diversified markets. However, it is conceivable that small firms cope with the vola-
tility of market demand by tying themselves to larger firms and groups, in exchange for an 
explicit or implicit insurance, thus smoothing their order book situation. Analogous strategies 
have been modelled to explain relationship banking in the context of firm finance, or implicit 
contracts in labour markets. Then, of course, it may also be the case that with their flat hierar-
chies and low co-ordination costs, small firms are more nimble and flexible in coping with 
demand shocks of a given size than are the more bureaucratic large firms. There is a less flat-
tering third possibility: small firms more than large firms might tend to ‘solve’ their capacity 
problems simply by frustrating customers. If all firms are profit maximisers, it is hard to think 
of any economic reason for such a differential behaviour. The profit motive, however, might 
be less prevalent among some of the smaller firms. 
Next we wish to look at survival experiences by financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms. The state is measured at the start of the spell. As before, there are two natural ways to 
analytically distinguish financially constrained and unconstrained firms. First, we can group a 
firm as financially constrained if it reports that it has to scale down investment because of in-
sufficient internal funds. Second, we can classify it as financially constrained if it cites either 
shortages of internal finance or the inability to obtain external finance. The difference be-
tween the two groupings is in those 44 spells where firms cite the inability to obtain external 
finance as a limitation to investment, without indicating shortages of internal finance at the 
same time. As such a pattern is incompatible with the standard pecking order view of corpo-
rate finance under financial constraints or the natural ordering that results from costly moni-
toring models as shown in Graph 1, we prefer the less ambivalent first grouping. Ultimately, 
the answer ‘costs of finance’ as a limit to capital expenditure might indicate the working of 
the classical user cost mechanism. Therefore we do not use it as a sorting criterion. 
We see that the prevalence of financial limitations is clearly higher among those firms that 
cite capacity restrictions. Whereas 25.3% of all capacity restrictions experiences are catego-
rised as ‘financially constrained’ according to the first criterion, and 28.4% according to the 
second criterion, the corresponding figures for the entire CBI data-set are 19.0% and 20.8%, 
respectively.  
Graph 4 depicts the results for the first criterion (shortage of internal finance) for the whole 
sample. The survival curve for financially unconstrained firms is everywhere beneath the   21 
curve for the financially constrained firms. This means the unconstrained firms are able to 
complete their spell of restricted capacity faster than the constrained firms. It is convenient to 
point out again that there are two competing causal explanations for this difference. For a 
given size of the capacity gap, financial constrained firms might take longer to fill it. On the 
other hand, firms with a huge capacity gap (and accordingly higher financing needs) might be 
more likely to report financial constraints. Comparing the survival curves essentially tests 
those two hypotheses jointly. 
It is instructive to look at the effect of financial constraints separately for small and for large 
firms. Graph 5 shows constrained and unconstrained small firms, and Graph 6 performs the 
same comparison for large firms. For both sub-samples, the curve for constrained firms is 
situated above the curve for unconstrained firms, as is expected. The graphs for the second 
criterion look essentially similar. Eyeballing suggests that the difference is more marked for 
small firms. It will be necessary to examine this and other differences statistically.  
4.6. A proportional hazard (Cox) model of duration 
In order to test the effect of size and financial constraints on the duration of capacity restric-
tions, we need to impose some structure. Let  ( ) 2 1,x x x =  be a two dimensional vector of indi-
cator variables for size and financial constraints. Specifically,  1 1 = x  indicates large size, and 
1 2 = x  a state of financial constraints at the beginning of the spell. As we have little a priori 
information about the underlying process, we do not want to restrict the form of the baseline 
survival function that corresponds to  ( ) 0 , 0 = x , the case of a small firm without financial con-
straints. In what follows, we explicitly recognise (1) that duration is distributed continuously 
over time, and (2) the measurement of the capacity restrictions for a given unit is taken at dis-
crete interval (quarters), j = 1, 2, ... k.21 Let  ( ) i x t, l  be the hazard for a unit with characteris-
tics  i x  at time t, defined as 
( ) ( ) h x t T h t T t P x t i h , lim ,
0 ‡ + < £ =
ﬁ l             (3) 
The hazard is the instantaneous rate at which spells are completed by units that have lasted 
until time t, defined in the same way as a mortality rate in demographics or a failure rate in 
the statistical theory of capital stock dynamics (see Appendix 2 for the details). We want to 
assume that the characteristics  x relate to the hazard rate in a proportional fashion: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) b l l ' exp , 0 i x t x t ￿ =  ,                (4) 
                                                 
21  The assumption of absolutely continuous time is made only for expositional convenience. A discrete time 
concept would not invalidate any of our results, after we have redefined the hazard rate in t as the conditional 
probability that the spell is completed in t+1, conditional on it having lasted until t. It is possible to conduct 
duration analysis with distributions of T that have both discrete and continuous portions. See Kalbfleisch and 
Prentice (2002) for a systematic approach.    22 
with  b being a vector of coefficients that needs to be estimated. The hazard ratio between an 
individual with characteristics  i x  and the baseline case is given by  ( ) b ' exp i x , which is ap-
proximately  b + 1  for small b. The hazard ratios between two individuals with characteristics 
1 x  and  0 x  are calculated as  ( ) [ ] b 0 1 exp x x - . Equation (4) constitutes the model of propor-
tional hazard, developed by Cox (1972). In this set-up, the baseline hazard remains com-
pletely unspecified, which is why the proportional hazard model figures among the semi-
parametric approaches. 
We assume that the spells of different firms are independent events and that the censoring 
mechanism is independent of the state of the firm. We can write the probability for the com-
pletion of a spell to be registered after j surveys as a product of conditional probabilities. This 
allows us to derive a likelihood function that contains ß as well as further (incidental) pa-
rameters describing, for the baseline case, the conditional probability of completing in the 
time interval between  1 - j  and  j , given that  1 - j  has been reached. The Appendix contains 
the full details and a derivation. The likelihood function can be shown to be identical to the 
likelihood function for a Bernoulli-experiment with probabilities that depend on time as well 
as on  i x  by means of a standard link function. The parameter estimates are asymptotically 
normally distributed. The panel nature of the data is taken into account by computing robust 
standard errors, with clusters defined by the firm identity. 
Table 11 contains the Maximum Likelihood estimations for a Cox model with two covariates: 
size and an indicator variable for the presence of financial constraints. As explained above, 
we use two alternative definitions of financial constraints. The dummy variable fin(1) takes a 
value of 1 to indicate that the firm cites insufficient internal finance at the outset of the spell. 
The dummy variable fin(2) will be 1 if the firm cites either insufficient internal finance or the 
inability to raise external finance The respective classification is maintained during the entire 
spell. 
In each cell, the first figure gives the estimated coefficients. Below, in curly brackets, this 
value is translated into a hazard ratio. Column (1), for example, compares the hazard rates for 
small and large firms. The hazard rate of a large firm is exp(–0.183) times the hazard ratio of 
a small firm, meaning that large firms are leaving the state of restricted capacity at a rate 
which is only about 83.3% that of a small firm. The third figure, in round brackets, indicates 
the robust standard deviations, taking into account stochastic dependence between spells gen-
erated by the same firm. The last entry, in square brackets, gives the z statistic for statistical 
significance: under the null hypothesis of no differences, the estimated coefficient divided by 
its standard error is asymptotically a standard normal variate. Investigating the table, we see 
that the lack of internal finance lowers the hazard rate to approximately the same extent as 
large size: the hazard rate for a constrained firm is only 82.6% of an unconstrained firm, 
meaning a longer duration of the restriction experience. This remains true if we consider both   23 
characteristics at the same time. In Column (4), we introduce an interaction term, thereby al-
lowing the sensitivity of large firms with respect to financial constraints to be different from 
that of small firms. In this regression, we can compare constrained small firms with uncon-
strained small firms using the fin(1) coefficient. Its value is 0.260, which is equivalent to a 
hazard ratio of 0.771%. The hazard ratio of a large constrained firm (as opposed to a large un-
constrained firm) is given by the sum of the fin(1) coefficient and the coefficient of the inter-
action term. We see that this coefficient is smaller, the estimated hazard ratio for large firms is 
only exp(–0.260+0.170) = 0.915. Furthermore, this value is not significantly different from 
zero. Performing a Wald-test on whether the sum of the coefficients on fin(1) and the interac-
tion term is zero, we obtain a value of the  ( ) 1
2 c -statistic of 0.58, which is equivalent to a p-
value of just 0.45. However, the difference in the sensitivity between small and large firms, 
given by the coefficient of the interaction term, is itself not significant. The last three columns 
of Table 13 give us the corresponding estimates with respect to our second indicator of finan-
cial constraints, fin(2). The picture is essentially similar, although the measured difference in 
the sensitivity between small and large firms is somewhat smaller.  
It may be argued that the detected differences between small and large firm may be sector 
specific. As firm size (and possibly financial constraints) may be sector specific too, we want 
to control for sectoral differences in order to avoid a missing variable bias. Table 14 repeats 
the estimates explained above, adding 20 dummies for 2 digit SIC sectors. This leads to a 
slight reduction in size effect: the hazard rate goes down from 0.833 to 0.855. In the estima-
tion featuring a size dummy, the fin(1) dummy and the interaction term, large size will lower 
the hazard rate by about 19%, lack of internal finance will depress it by almost 25%, but the 
interaction term, although still insignificant by itself, will neutralise almost the entire effect of 
financial constraints for large firms. Again, the estimates using the second criterion for finan-
cial constraints are very similar, although the measured effects seems less strong. 
A third set of estimates, collected in Table 15, controls for the position in the business cycle, 
by including dummies for the time of the start of the spell. This is done in order to account for 
a possible dependence of duration on the general state of the economy. In a time of depres-
sion, investors might be less inclined to close capacity gaps. At the same time, internal finan-
cial resources might be scarcer and external finance might be more difficult to obtain. In our 
estimates, adding the controls for the business cycle situation makes the size effects come out 
more clearly, whereas the measured effects of financial constraints are somewhat smaller, as 
predicted. In our preferred estimate, which includes an interaction term, both characteristics 
lower the hazard rate by about 22 % with respect to the baseline case. These two values are 
highly significant. For large firms, the interaction term lowers the financial constraints sensi-
tivity by about one half. The hazard rate of a constrained large firm versus an unconstrained 
firm is measured at 91.6. Statistically, this is not significant –the  ( ) 1
2 c -statistic yields a value 
of 0.94, corresponding to a p-value of 0.33.   24 
The estimates for large and for small firms in Table 11, 12 and 13 are not independent, as the 
coefficients on the duration time dummies are restricted to be identical.22 We want to repeat 
the comparison by estimating a proportional hazards model separately for large and for small 
firms. This is equivalent to including interaction terms for time dummies in the previous re-
gressions. As we want to economise on degrees of freedom, we perform this regression only 
for the basic model without additional dummies indicating sector or date of spell origin. The 
results do not differ perceptibly from what has been seen before: with small firms, the pres-
ence of financial constraints leads us to predict a smaller hazard and a longer duration of the 
capacity restrictions experience. For large firms, the estimated difference points in the same 
direction, but it is smaller and not significantly different from zero.  
As a whole, our regressions give us two statistically significant results and a consistent overall 
pattern. Holding everything else constant, size clearly has an effect on the duration of capacity 
constraints. Hazard rates for large firms are about 20%-25% lower compared to small firms. 
Second, for small firms at least, financial constraints according to either of our two definitions 
make a difference. For a constrained small firm, the hazard is between 24% and 29% smaller 
than for an unconstrained small firm. For large firms, on the other hand, we do not find a sta-
tistically significant difference between constrained and unconstrained firms. We do not think 
that it is justified to conclude that financial constraints are unimportant or uninformative for 
larger firms. The results from the association analysis in Section 3 do not support this inter-
pretation. It is quite possible that our sample size is not big enough to deliver significant re-
sults for our sub-sample of larger firms. The sensitivity difference between the two groups is 
everywhere insignificant. However, the overall pattern of a lower, but still positive depend-
ence of duration on financial constraints is suggestive.  
5. Conclusion 
Our association and duration analysis have shown that the CBI financial constraints data are 
not without informational content – as theoretically expected, financially constrained firms 
are more often capacity constrained and they take longer to close capacity gaps than uncon-
strained firms. This means we can take our survey information seriously. They indicate that 
financial constraints and real activity are indeed interrelated. Survey information on the ups 
and downs of financial constraints indicators can therefore be a potentially valuable policy 
tool. 
The descriptive analysis does not show any clear distinction between large and small firms 
with respect to the importance of financial constraints. The analysis of association between 
financial constraints and capacity restrictions does not yield sizeable differences, either. 
                                                 
22 The time dummies are related to the conditional probabilities of completing for the baseline group, see Ap-
pendix 2   25 
Looking at the duration of capacity restrictions, we see that small firms are able to close their 
capacity gaps faster. Financial constraints make a clear difference for small firms: they sig-
nificantly prolong their spells of capacity restrictions. For larger firms, the measured effect is 
positive, too, but insignificant. We do not think, however, that it is justified to conclude that 
financial constraints do not matter for large firms. 
The precise nature of the relationship between the real and the financial spheres remains to be 
worked out. Real investment decisions may certainly cause financial constraints, and on the 
other hand those financial constraints may slow down or prevent expansion plans. By means 
of a more structural approach, we may have a chance to tell the two directions of causation 
apart. 
Appendix: A maximum likelihood estimator for the proportional 
hazard model with censored grouped panel data 
As has already been discussed, a very important feature of our data-set is that the observations 
are grouped. The observational units are surveyed in certain intervals and if there is a status 
change, we get to know only the left and the right boundary for the date when the change took 
place. And as the typical duration experience (spell) only lasts a few quarters, we have to take 
this limitation very seriously.  
This makes it impossible to use many of the standard procedures that assume a continuous 
flow of information. In a certain sense, however, the restriction also makes life easier. As we 
do not see what happens in between two surveys, all survivor functions that yield the same 
pattern of probability masses on the intervals are observationally equivalent. It is only this 
pattern that counts for inferential purposes. And as there are not too many quarters, the pattern 
can be parameterised relatively easily.  
Below, we think of the duration as distributed in continuous time. Information, however, ar-
rives at discrete points and is supposed to cover the interval between two observations. Our 
derivation of a maximum likelihood estimator for the case of grouped data relies heavily on 
Hosmer and Lemeshow (1999), Sect. 7.4 (but also see Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002), Sect. 
5.8 for a more general exposition). 
In Equation (3), the hazard function has been defined as the instantaneous rate at which spells 
are completed by units that have lasted until time t, just like a mortality rate in demographic 
analysis. Let  ) , ( x t f  be the (continuous) density of duration t and  ) , ( x t S  the survivor func-
tion, indicating the probability of duration of at least t, being the probability mass on the right 
tail of the distribution. Then the hazard function may be written as 
  ( ) ) , ( log
) , (
) , (





x t = = l  .            (A.1)   26 
The hazard function completely determines the distribution. In survival analysis, the most 
widely used model to analyse the influence of covariates x is the proportional hazard model 
introduced into the literature by Cox (1972). Given a set of covariates and a vector of pa-
rameters ß, the constituting assumption is  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) x'ß t x t exp , 0 ￿ = l l  .              (A.2) 
The hazard function for an individual with covariates x differs from a baseline hazard  0 l  by a 
multiple  ( ) x'ß exp  that may or may not be constant. Most importantly for estimation purposes, 
the baseline hazard remains completely unspecified. Therefore, the Cox model is classified as 
a semi-parametric approach. The substantive content of the Cox assumption rests in the haz-
ard ratio for two units with covariates  0 x  and  1 x : 
( )





1 exp - =  .              (A.3) 
We want to develop a maximum likelihood procedure for the estimation of a proportional 
hazard model with censored grouped panel data. In our set-up, measurement is taken at cer-
tain intervals: { } k j , , 2 , 1 K = . For all individual spells i, we define a censoring variable  i c  that 
takes the value  1 = i c  if the end of the duration is observed, and  0 = i c  if not. Let  i l t =  be the 
time when the spell i is last observed. Calculating the probability of a given duration experi-
ence, we have to distinguish two cases. If  1 = i c  (not censored), we know that the duration 
was completed by  i l t = , and the completion event must have occurred somewhere in the in-
terval between  1 - i l  and  i l . That means: 
  ( ) ( ) b b , , , , 1 i i i i i x l S x l S P - - =   for   1 = i c  .        (A.4) 
If  0 = i c , right censoring occurs in  i l t = . Up to the last observation, the event has not oc-
curred, and the probability for this outcome is:  
  ( ) b , , i i i x l S P =  .                (A.5) 
This fundamental distinction is typical for estimation with censored data; see, for example, 
Maddala (1983), Chapter 6, or Wooldridge (2002), Chapters 16 and 20. Assuming for a mo-
ment that the spells are independent, we may write the likelihood function as  
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { }
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )



































































    (A.6)   27 
The seemingly unwieldy transformation above yields a key insight. Both the censored and the 
uncensored individuals contribute the amount  ( ) b , , 1 x l S i -  to the likelihood, the information 
that the duration of the experience had not ended by  1 - i l . Conditional on this information, 
the contributions differ only for period  i l t = . For the non-censored durations with  1 = i c , the 
spell has ended by  i l t = . This event has the conditional probability 









j i x j S
x j S x j S
-
- -
=   for i l j = .        (A.7) 
The above expression is the probability that completion takes place between  1 - i l  and  i l , 
given the fact that it has already lasted until  1 - i l .23 For the censored cases, we have the in-
formation that the spell has not ended in  i l t = , the conditional probability of which is 









j i x j S
x j S
-
= -    for i l j = .          (A.8) 
Lastly, we may rewrite the survivor function in  1 - = i l t  as the product of conditional sur-
vival probabilities for all periods up to  1 - i l :  





x l S ,
1
1
1 , , 1 q b - ￿ = -
-
=
 .              (A.9) 
Substituting these expressions into (A6) yields the likelihood function: 























1 1 q q q  .          (A.10) 
We can rewrite this expression in a way that permits the maximum likelihood estimation us-
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z  .              (A.11) 
Using this variable in (A10) yields an expression that has the form of the likelihood for a gen-
eralised binary regression model: 
  ( )
















1 q q ￿ - ￿ ￿ =
-
= =
 .             (A.12) 
                                                 
23 This conditional probability of completion is conceptually similar, although not identical, to the hazard rate 
defined above in (3) and (A.1). However, whereas ?i,j is a true probability that is defined over an interval, the 
latter is an instantaneous rate that refers to a single point in the distribution and is allowed to have values 
greater than one. This is analogous to the relationship between a density of a continuous random variable and 
the probability that a value in a certain interval is assumed.      28 
For each duration experience i, (A.12) is the likelihood for  i l  independent binary observations 
with probabilities  j i, q  and outcomes  j i z , . In order to use this for an estimate of  b , we need 
the link function that relates  j i, q  to the covariates  i x . A link function is a transformation such 
that the transformed probability  j i, q  is a linear function of  i x . With some algebra, we can 
show that under the Cox assumption (A.2), the following relationship holds for the survivor 
function: 
  ( ) ( )
( ) b b
' exp , ,
x
o t S x t S =  ,              (A.13) 
and some more algebra yields the following link function: 
  ( ) [ ] j j i x t b q + = - - ' 1 ln ln , ,  where            (A.14)) 






















j t  .              (A.15) 
The link function (A.14) is the complementary log-log function. After creating artificial val-
ues j and  j i z ,  for each interval  i l t £ , we define time dummies for each interval j. We can es-
timate  b  and the  j t  as the coefficients of the covariates and the time dummies, respectively, 
using a binary regression package with the link function (A.14).24  
Several firms contribute more than one duration experience. We take account of the panel 
nature of our data-set calculating robust standard deviations clustered with respect to the firm, 
rather than those standard deviations that assume independence. This allows for an arbitrary 
correlation pattern for the observations of any given firm. The assumption of independence 
between firms, however, is retained.  
By means of (A.15), we can recover the maximum likelihood estimates of the baseline condi-
tional survival probabilities,  ( ) ( ) 1 0 0 - t S t S , taking into account the fact that that  ( ) 1 0 0 ” S . 
Calculating their products yields the estimate of the baseline survivor function. In a model 
without covariates, the survivorship function estimated in this way is identical to the Kaplan-
Meier estimator discussed earlier. The standard deviations in Table A1 were calculated by 
simulating survival curves with 20,000 replications of  8 ,..., 1 , = t j j , on the basis of the maxi-
mum likelihood estimation of the parameter and the variance-covariance matrix. In the pres-
ence of covariates  j x , the baseline survivorship function refers to a hypothetical unit with co-
variates  0 = j x . This is easy to interpret if the covariate is an indicator variable for a sample 
split. In more complex cases, however, the baseline survivor function does not necessarily 
make sense by itself. 
                                                 
24 For our estimations, we have used the cloglog routine in Stata, version 8.   29 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Breakdown of data-set by employment size 
1-199 200-499 500-4,999 5,000 and over Total
No. of firms 3,394 1,060 647 68 5,169
No. of observations 31,089 10,222 6,994 939 49,244
Employment Size
 
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
 
 
Table 2: Number of observations split by employment size and 2 digit SIC code 
2 Digit SIC code Employment Size
1-199 200-499 500-4999 5000 and over Total
Coke ovens 17 6 17 0 40
Mineral oil processing 73 35 38 11 157
Nuclear fuel production 0 0 0 2 2
Extraction & preparation of metalliferous ores 35 0 0 0 35
Metal manufacturing 1,429 460 292 62 2,243
Extraction of minerals not elsewhere specified 493 60 103 9 665
Manufacturing of non-metallic mineral products 1,286 436 443 85 2,250
Chemical industries 1,191 722 641 79 2,633
Production of man-made fibres 142 8 32 1 183
Manufacturing of metal goods not elsewhere specified 3,048 651 308 6 4,013
Mechanical engineering 7,116 1,718 1,028 23 9,885
Manufacturing of office machinery & data processing 103 26 90 7 226
Electrical & electronic engineering 2,991 1,420 808 54 5,273
Manufacturing of motor vehicles & parts thereof 691 409 409 187 1,696
Manufacturing of other transport equipment 315 132 136 111 694
Instrument engineering 838 230 69 0 1,137
Food, drink & tobacco manufacturing industries part 1 473 250 420 43 1,186
Food, drink & tobacco manufacturing industries part 2 689 399 454 151 1,693
Textile industries 2,427 1,098 594 7 4,126
Manufacturing of leather & leather goods 295 63 2 0 360
Footwear & clothing industries 1,439 478 262 39 2,218
Timber & wooden furniture industries 1,258 313 154 1 1,726
Manufacturing of paper & paper products 2,854 668 489 38 4,049
Processing of rubber & plastics 1,698 563 169 22 2,452
Other manufacturing industries 188 77 36 1 302
Total 31,089 10,222 6,994 939 49,244
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey   33 
 
Table 3: Business optimism statistics 
Mean Std. Dev. Freq.
Small Firms -0.075 0.703 31089
Large Firms -0.085 0.679 18155
Total -0.079 0.694 49244  
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
 
 
Table 4: Main reasons given for any expected capital expenditure on buildings,  
plant or machinery over the coming 12 months 
  Small Firms  Large Firms  All Firms 
To expand capacity  17.1  19.5  18.0 
To increase efficiency  45.5  58.7  50.4 
For replacement  27.3  23.7  25.9 
Other  3.4  5.7  4.3 
N/A  13.2  2.9  9.4 
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
Percentage of those firms reporting each reason as their most important 
 
 





Inability to raise 





Large Firms Any rank 47.59% 20.23% 2.99% 9.44% 49.11% 4.92% 2.07% 7.38%
Rank 1 37.01% 14.94% 1.37% 4.59% 36.81% 2.54% 1.81% 8.03%
Small Firms Any rank 33.52% 18.12% 5.07% 11.34% 58.25% 6.20% 1.58% 9.77%
Rank 1 22.95% 12.78% 2.30% 5.63% 49.01% 2.89% 1.44% 10.34%
Total data set Any rank 38.71% 18.89% 4.30% 10.64% 54.88% 5.73% 1.76% 8.89%
Rank 1 28.14% 13.58% 1.96% 5.25% 44.51% 2.76% 1.58% 9.49%  
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
Firms ranking the constraint as a limit on the capital expenditure authorisations, as a percentage of all firms,  
including those who did not answer the question at all. Respondents were able to give one or more responses,  
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Table 6: Variability and Persistence of Financial Constraints 
  Unconstr. in t  Constr. in t  Total 



















Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey. Number and share of responding firms reporting either shortage of 




Table 7: Association of Capacity Restrictions and Financial Constraints - All Firms 
 
    Capacity restrictions 
    Not restricted   Restricted  Total 



























   
Association Tests 
Pearson's test:     Chi2(2) =  431.39   P < 0.0005 
Likelihood ratio test:  Chi2(2) =  389.00  P < 0.0005 
Fisher's exact test         P < 0.0005 
 
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey. Number and share of responding firms reporting shortage of internal 
finance or inability to raise external finance as a factor likely to limit capital expenditure over the next twelve 
months (rows) and number and share of firms reporting plant capacity as likely to limit output over the next 4 
months (columns) .   35 
Table 8: All Firms - Association of Capacity Restrictions and Financial Constraints 
Conditional on state of capacity restrictions in the previous period 
 
Capacity restrictions  Case 1: No capacity restrictions 
in previous period 
Not restricted   Restricted  Total 



























   
Association Tests 
Pearson's test:     Chi2(2) =  137.18   P < 0.0005 
Likelihood ratio test:  Chi2(2) =  124.07  P < 0.0005 
Fisher's exact test         P < 0.0005 
Capacity restrictions  Case 2: Capacity restrictions 
in previous period 
Not restricted   Restricted  Total 



























   
Association Tests 
Pearson's test:     Chi2(2) =  39,47     P < 0.0005 
Likelihood ratio test:  Chi2(2) =  39.76    P < 0.0005 
Fisher's exact test         P < 0.0005 
 
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey. Number and share of responding firms reporting shortage of internal 
finance or inability to raise external finance as a factor likely to limit capital expenditure over the next twelve 
months (rows) and number and share of firms reporting plant capacity as likely to limit output over the next 4 
months (columns) .   36 
Table 9: Small Firms - Association of Capacity Restrictions and Financial Constraints  
Conditional on state of capacity restrictions in the previous period 
 
Capacity restrictions  Case 1: No capacity restrictions 
in previous period 
Not restricted   Restricted  Total 



























   
Association Tests 
Pearson's test:     Chi2(2) =  91.47     P < 0.0005 
Likelihood ratio test:  Chi2(2) =  82.16    P < 0.0005 
Fisher's exact test:        P < 0.0005 
Capacity restrictions  Case 2: Capacity restrictions 
in previous period 
Not restricted   Restricted  Total 



























   
Association Tests 
Pearson's test:     Chi2(2) =  37,82     P < 0.0005 
Likelihood ratio test:  Chi2(2) =  38.01    P < 0.0005 
Fisher's exact test :        P < 0.0005 
 
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey. Number and share of responding firms reporting shortage of internal 
finance or inability to raise external finance as a factor likely to limit capital expenditure over the next twelve 
months (rows) and number and share of firms reporting plant capacity as likely to limit output over the next 4 
months (columns) .   37 
Table 10: Large Firms - Association of Capacity Restrictions and Financial Constraints  
Conditional on state of capacity restrictions in the previous period 
 
Capacity restrictions  Case 1: No capacity restrictions 
in previous period 
Not restricted   Restricted  Total 



























   
Association Tests 
Pearson's test:     Chi2(2) =  137.18   P < 0.0005 
Likelihood ratio test:  Chi2(2) =  124.07  P < 0.0005 
Fisher's exact test :        P < 0.0005 
Capacity restrictions  Case 2: Capacity restrictions 
in previous period 
Not restricted   Restricted  Total 



























   
Association Tests 
Pearson's test:     Chi2(2) =  6.06       P = 0.048 
Likelihood ratio test:  Chi2(2) =  6.10    P = 0.047 
Fisher's exact test :        P = 0.049 
 
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey. Number and share of responding firms reporting shortage of internal 
finance or inability to raise external finance as a factor likely to limit capital expenditure over the next twelve 
months (rows) and number and share of firms reporting plant capacity as likely to limit output over the next 4 
months (columns) .   38 
 
Table 11: Survivor Function and Completion Probabilities for the Entire Sample 





1  1431  856  133  0.5982  0.4018  00138 
2  442  216  43  0.4887  0.2055  00123 
3  183  63  16  0.3443  0.1347  00107 
4  104  40  11  0.3846  0.0829  00090 
5  53  12  7  0.2264  0.0641  00082 
6  34  13  4  0.3824  0.0396  00074 
7  17  3  2  0.1765  0.0326  00072 
8  12  3  3  0.2500  0.0245  00069 
9  6  3  0  0.5000  0.0122  . 
 
 
Table 12: Composition of Sub-Samples 
Sub-Sample  No. of experiences  Times at risk  Incidence rates 
All Firms  1,431  2,291  0.528 
Small Firms  887  1,365  0.559 
Large Firms  544  926  0.482 
Shortage of int. finance  363  625  0.467 
No shortage of int. finance  1,068  1,666  0.551 
Shortage of int. or ext. finance  407  703  0.472 
No shortage of int. or ext. finance  1,024  1,588  0.553 
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Table 13: ML Estimation of a Proportional Hazard Model with Grouped Panel Data 
Coefficient  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
large 





































     
large*fin(1) 
(Interaction term) 




     
               
fin(2) 
(Shortage internal 
or external finance) 


















               
Duration time 
dummies 
9  9  9  9  9  9  9 
Sector dummies  no  no  no  no  no  no  no 
Dummies for time 
origin of spells 
no  no  no  no  no  no  no 
No. of spells 
No. of firms 























Cox duration model with grouped data for spells of capacity constraints, estimated as a binary regression model 
using the complementary log-log function as link function, see the Appendix for details. A spell is classified as 
pertaining to a financially constrained firm if, at the time when the spell starts, the firm reports financial 
constraints. The dummy variable fin(1) takes a value of 1 if a firm reports shortage of internal finance in the 
answer to question 16c, else it is zero. The dummy variable fin(2) takes a value of 1 if the firm reports either 
shortage of internal finance or inability to raise external finance, else it is zero. Likewise, a spell is classified as 
belonging to a large firm if the firm has 200 employees or more at the beginning of the spell. One observation 
had to be dropped because the longest duration interval (13 quarters) predicts the event perfectly    40 
 
Table 14: ML Estimation of a Proportional Hazard Model with Grouped Panel Data 
Controlling for Sector Heterogeneity 
Coefficient  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
large 





































     
large*fin(1) 
(Interaction term) 




     
               
fin(2) 
(Shortage internal 
or external finance) 


















               
Duration time 
dummies 
9  9  9  9  9  9  9 
Sector dummies  20  20  20  20  20  20  20 
Dummies for time 
origin of spells 
no  no  no  no  no  no  no 
No. of spells 
No. of firms 























Cox duration model with grouped data for spells of capacity constraints, estimated as a binary regression model 
using the complementary log-log function as link function, see the Appendix for details. A spell is classified as 
pertaining to a financially constrained firm if, at the time when the spell starts, the firm reports financial 
constraints. The dummy variable fin(1) takes a value of 1 if a firm reports shortage of internal finance in the 
answer to question 16c, else it is zero. The dummy variable fin(2) takes a value of 1 if the firm reports either 
shortage of internal finance or inability to raise external finance, else it is zero. Likewise, a spell is classified as 
belonging to a large firm if the firm has 200 employees or more at the beginning of the spell. Additionally, the 
regressions summarised in this table use 20 dummies representing SIC (1980) 2 digit sectors. One observation 
had to be dropped because the longest duration interval (13 quarters) predicts the event perfectly. Two more 
observations and one sector (manufacturing of office machinery and data processing) were dropped because the 
sector dummy predicts the event perfectly    41 
 
Table 15: ML Estimation of a Proportional Hazard Model with Grouped Panel Data 
Controlling for Sector Heterogeneity and Business Cycle Effects 
Coefficient  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
large 





































     
large*fin(1) 
(Interaction term) 




     
               
fin(2) 
(Shortage internal 
or external finance) 


















               
Duration time 
dummies 
9  9  9  9  9  9  9 
Sector dummies  20  20  20  20  20  20  20 
Dummies for time 
origin of spells 
41  41  41  41  41  41  41 
No. of spells 
No. of firms 























Cox duration model with grouped data for spells of capacity constraints, estimated as a binary regression model 
using the complementary log-log function as link function, see the Appendix for details. A spell is classified as 
pertaining to a financially constrained firm if, at the time when the spell starts, the firm reports financial 
constraints. The dummy variable fin(1) takes a value of 1 if a firm reports shortage of internal finance in the 
answer to question 16c, else it is zero. The dummy variable fin(2) takes a value of 1 if the firm reports either 
shortage of internal finance or inability to raise external finance, else it is zero. Likewise, a spell is classified as 
belonging to a large firm if the firm has 200 employees or more at the beginning of the spell. Additionally, the 
regressions summarised in this table use 20 dummies representing SIC (1980) 2 digit sectors, s well as 41 
dummies indicating the time origin of the spell. One observation had to be dropped because the longest duration 
interval (13 quarters) predicts the event perfectly. Two more observations and one sector (manufacturing of 
office machinery and data processing) were dropped because the sector dummy predicts the event perfectly.   42 
 
Table 16: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of  a Proportional Hazard Model with 
Grouped Panel Data – Separate Estimates for Large and for Small firms 




























     












Duration time dummies  9  9  9  9  9  9 
No. of spells 





















Cox duration model with grouped data for spells of capacity constraints, estimated as a binary regression model 
using the complementary log-log function as link function, see the Appendix for details. A spell is classified as 
pertaining to a financially constrained firm if, at the time when the spell starts, the firm reports shortage of 
internal finance or inability to raise external finance as a factor likely to limit capital expenditure over the next 
twelve months. Likewise, a spell is classified as belonging to a large firm if the firm has 200 employees or more 
at the beginning of the spell. One observation had to be dropped because the longest duration interval (13 
quarters) predicts the event perfectly.   43 
Charts 
 
Chart 1: Trend in business optimism  
 
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
1 = more optimistic, 0 = same and -1 = less optimistic 
 
 
























































































Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
1 = not below capacity, -1 = below capacity 
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
Respondents were able to give one or more responses, hence 



























% change in manufacturing production index
(2000=100) constant prices  44 
 









































































Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
1= above normal, 0 = about normal and -1 = below normal 
 
 
Chart 5:  
Investment intentions buildings 
Chart 6:  



































Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
1 = more authorisations, 0 = same and -1 = less 
authorisations 
 
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
1 = more authorisations, 0 = same and -1 = less 
authorisations 
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Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
% of firms ranking each constraint as the most important limit on the capital expenditure authorisations 
 
 













































































Inability to raise external
finance Large
Inability to raise external
finance Small
Cost of finance Large
Cost of finance Small
 
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
Percentage of firms ranking each constraint as the most important limit on the capital expenditure authorisations 
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Graphs 
Graph 1: Capital demand and external finance premium 
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Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by firm size
analysis time








Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by financial constraints.
analysis time










constrained  48 
Graph 5: 
Small Firms Only:  






















Large Firms Only:  























Small firms only: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by fin. constr.
analysis time










Large firms only: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by fin. constr.
analysis time
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